This paper examines the impact of China's participation in global health governance (GHG) by addressing two interrelated questions. First, how has China's involvement had an impact on GHG? Second, to what extent has China's GHG involvement resulted in changes in its domestic health governance? It finds that in the areas of health-related development assistance, global disease prevention and control, and global health rule making, China is making a difference in global health governance processes and outcomes. Meanwhile, despite the opaque and exclusive authoritarian structure in China, global health players, norms, and processes have a significant role to play in the country's domestic health governance, including health agenda setting, health policy formulation and implementation. The magnitude and significance of China's participation cannot simply be accommodated by the existing analytical framework. To be sure, China's engagement in GHG thus far is still narrow and limited, and not always constructive. But these constraints and limits are not static as the domestic and international context for China's engagement is changing. As China becomes more sensitive to international norms, pressures, and influences, it is anticipated to play a much bigger role in global health governance.
SARS crisis provide further impetus to engage in global health. Over the past years, with the growing economic prowess of China, international pressures for China to shoulder more global health responsibilities also grow (see Chow 2010) .
As China becomes increasingly engaged in global health, we would expect China to play a bigger contributing role to global health governance initiatives, institutions and processes. Due to the population size and the geoeconomic importance, not only will China's shifting health policy priorities and health system capacity building have global repercussions, but the form and substance of its health diplomacy may provide alternative approaches to GHG, even affect the willingness and capacity of other countries in coping with global health challenges. In the meantime, the dynamics of global health governance, as reflected in the proliferation of various influential actors, growing normative pressures and discourses, and availability of additional external resources and information channels, would affect China's domestic governance and health policies. This paper examines the impact of China's GHG participation by addressing two interrelated questions. First, how has China's involvement had an impact on GHG? Second, to what extent has China's GHG involvement resulted in changes in its domestic health governance?
A comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the impact of China's involvement in GHG is needed for understanding the effectiveness and dynamics of GHG, not only because China plays a critical role in the complex dynamics among health, development, and security but also because the rising China has raised tremendous expectations on its engagement in GHG. The improved knowledge about the dynamics of the behavior of China as a GHG participant helps increase China's capability to be a constructive participant in GHG and thus create a stronger foundation for international cooperation to address pressing global health challenges.
In examining the impact on global health governance, this study looks at China's effectiveness in promoting health-related development cooperation, its contribution to global disease prevention and control, as well as its role in global health rule making. An examination of the impact on domestic health governance will be conducted by exploring the role of global health governance in domestic health agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy implementation.
Impact on Global Health Governance

China as an aid donor
Beginning in the 1960s, driven by the need to export revolution and expand China's political influence in the Third World, China increased its foreign aid. The level of foreign aid reached an all-time high in the 1970s (Yang and Chen 2010: 49-50) . Specifically, during 1963 Specifically, during -1982 ,500 Chinese health workers joined the medical teams and served a total of seventy million people in 42 countries, including 32 in Africa (Huang 2010: 108-109) . Until 1978, Chinese medical teams provided services and some material supplies completely free of charge (Zhu 1984: 39) . The content of Chinese health aid practice bore the firm imprint of the Maoist health system, which focused on equality and universalism. Most medical teams operated in outlying areas where local people had difficult to access health care. In doing so, they focused on primary health care. Following the Maoist approach of putting the emphasis of health care to the countryside, the medical teams also introduced mobile medical care to the recipient countries (Wang Ningjun 2009) . This occurred at a time when it was increasingly evident that the western-based medical model (which emphasizes hospital-based treatment of patients, curative care, and high-technology interventions) was becoming increasingly unaffordable to meet the basic needs of populations in poor countries. In this sense, the export of the Chinese primary health care model to the Third World not only improved people's health status of the recipient countries, but also presented an alternative approach to health care provision in limited resource settings (Lee 2009: 73) . Indeed, a report of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress concluded that " [m] edical services have proven one of China's most effective economic aid programs in the Third World" (Fogarty 1978: 856) .
Since the 1980s, there have been changes in the form and substance of China's health aid program. With the resumption of its UN seats, China began to explore international development cooperation that combined aid money with funding from UN and other multilateral agencies (Brautigam 2009: 65) . Rather than focus on the dispatch of medical teams, China diversified forms of providing health aid by cooperating with African countries in running hospitals/clinics and delivering medical services. The market-oriented economic reform and integration into the world economy had a bearing on the China's health aid policy. Instead of treating foreign aid purely as a "political task" or providing only "one-way" free aid, China since the mid-1990s emphasized the economic aspect of foreign aid and used it to promote mutual benefits, trade, and market expansion. In order to expand its political influence and boost pharmaceutical exports in Africa, the government launched a broader charm offensive to construct health care facilities and donate medicine to Africa. At the Sino-African Summit in November 2006, President Hu pledged to provide $37.5 million in grants to supply artemisinin and build 30 anti-malaria centers in Africa. By the end of 2009, China has completed more than 100 hospitals and health care centers and donated tremens amount of medical equipment and drug products (State Council Information Office 2011).
The contribution of China's health-related development assistance on GHG should not be exaggerated. As the world's 2 nd largest economy, with the largest foreign exchange reserve, China is still not considered an active donor to global health -indeed, it did not officially join the donor club until December 2011 at the High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid effectiveness in Busan, Korea. Until very recently, it makes only a nominal contribution to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. But in the meantime, it has been aggressively seeking Global
Fund grants. By raking in nearly $1 billion from a fund ostensibly dedicated to helping the world's poorest countries, critics argue that China threatens to undermine the entire premise behind the Global Fund (Chow 2010) . Perhaps more importantly, since global health governance is narrowly defined in terms of engaging critical stakeholders while bringing coherence to the global health initiatives and projects (WHO 2011) , it is necessary to examine the degree to which China's health aid aligns with international practice. Unlike most OECD countries, China in offering health aid does not attach political strings (except for the issue of Taiwan). Thus China's aid programs run in direct competition to programs that emphasize governance, accountability, and human rights. Second, Chinese programs are not fully aligned on the needs of the recipient countries. In addressing the threat of infectious diseases, for example, less interest was given to tackling major health threats such as HIV/AIDS and TB.
Even the commitment to fighting malaria was undermined by the fraudulent Chinese-made medicines flooded in African markets (Garrett and Huang 2011) . Third, despite the interest in multilateralism, China still prefers bilateral aid. The lack of transparency in its bilateral aid programs makes it next to impossible to gauge the full extent and nature of its health aid program.
There is also issue of efficiency. As noted by Amanda Glassman, through pooled funding multilateral aid is more efficient than bilateral aid because the latter raises administrative costs, and greatly increases burden on recipients, on the one hand, and caused problems of coordination and harmonization, on the other (Glassman 2012 
Impact on Domestic Health Governance
Public policy refers to what governments do as they transact with civil society, the economy, and states within a global state system (Katznelson 2001: 11541 This section focuses on the impact of China's GHG participation on its domestic health governance. In particular, it examines on how the actors, processes, and institutions of global health shape the health policy agenda setting, policy formulation, and implementation in China.
Global health governance and health agenda setting
Agenda setting is a process in which issues or problems start in the public (nongovernmental "systemic" agenda) and move to government ("governmental agenda" and "decision agenda"). A given condition gets defined as a problem awaiting government action through means by which government officials learn about conditions (e.g., indicators, focusing events, formal and informal feedback about the operation of existing programs) and ways in which conditions become defined as problems (when conditions violate important values or comparison with other countries led to unacceptable results; or a condition is reclassified into a "problem" category) (see Kingdon 1995) .
By investing in China's surveillance and laboratory capacity building and by providing formal and informal policy feedback, global health actors facilitated policy learning in China's health governance, which in turn helps transform a systemic agenda into a government agenda.
Moreover, global health processes, through bilateral and multilateral exchanges, workshops and conferences, international media coverage, and policy reports released by reputable international agencies, can be instrumental in reclassifying public health conditions in China into the "problem" category, while at the same time bringing to the fore a new discourse on healthrelated issues. This is especially the case when a public health threat is reframed as a 
Global health governance and China's health policy formulation
Policy formulation is the development of effective and acceptable courses of action for addressing what has been placed on the policy agenda. It involves the process of specifying alternatives that narrows the set of conceivable alternatives to the set that is seriously considered for governmental action. Specialists usually play an active role in the analytical phase of policy formulation. Despite the growing participation of international actors, their role in policy formulation is confined to the analytical phase, or "the process of specifying alternatives that narrows the set of conceivable alternatives to the set that is seriously considered for governmental action" (Kingdon 1995: 4) . International actors have a say in this process as long as their policy ideas are technically/budgetary feasible, and/or congruent with the values of policy community. But the policy idea must be authorized through a political process before being enacted. It is in the political phase that decision makers, not specialists, have their way. The danger is that when a health issue is placed in the realm of realpolitik, it runs the risk of being "dependent on the logic of such politics-which is not based on science and not subject to public deliberation and peer review, but on the Machiavellian instincts of those in power" (Obemann 2007 (Obemann : 1688 . The discrepancy between the government openness and receptivity in alternative specification, on the one hand, and the autonomy of decision makers in policy enactment, on the other, may explain why "good" international influence in one case may have "bad" impact on the other. As we have discussed, concern about international image was a major factor in China's policy shift toward 
Global health governance and China's health policy implementation
Policy implementation is the process by which policies enacted by government are put into effect by the relevant agencies. While various factors can affect policy implementation, state capacity constitutes a key variable in connecting the wheel to the rudder. But building state capacity also means building effective partnerships and institutions internationally. Given that a country's public health problems reduce state capacity when ever-increasing capacity is needed to tackle the challenges, purely endogenous solutions to build capacity are unlikely to be successful, and capacity will have to be imported from exogenous sources such as massive foreign aid (Price-Smith 2002: 127) . In this respect, the role of global health governance actors and processes is two-fold. First, they increase the government's financial capacity in the health sector by opening an alternative source of financing. In the early 1980s, for example, UNICEF provided equipment worth US$20 million to build the cold chain in child immunization, which was matched by funding from the Chinese government. After the funding problems were solved, the cold chain covered more than 90 percent of the regions, providing more than six immunization services annually (Jiankang bao 1/15/1999). Second, international aid can strengthen the bureaucratic capacity through technical assistance, policy counseling, and personnel training. In 1990, the Ministry submitted an application to the World Bank requesting funding for the project on epidemic and endemic disease control. Starting from 1992, 42 percent of the funding was spent on providing free diagnosis and treatment services for potential TB patients in 12 provinces. By September 1996, the project had covered 1,148 counties in 12 provincial units (ZGWSNJ 1997: 100) . Providing free diagnosis and treatment gave incentives for people to seek care, especially in poor provinces. As a result, China was able to provide free diagnosis for 2.56 million potential TB carriers, from which more than half million patients were identified for treatment. In six counties of Hunan Province, within two months in 1992 1,874 TB cases were identified as positive, compared with only 907 cases identified in the past year (Jiankang bao, 8/2/1992). Once the full extent of the problem became known, China became serious about providing subsidies for treatment and appropriate incentives for providers of care.
Through a WHO-recommended method Directly Observed Therapy Short Course, or DOTS, the cure rate increased from less than 50 percent to 91.3 percent, although the TB registration rate had increased from 8.63/100,000 to 18.43/100,000 (Jiankang bao 9/29/1996; ZGWSNJ 1997:
More recently, China has collaborated with World Bank in avian/human flu prevention and control. Implemented in 10 counties, this three-year project aimed to strengthening local state capacity in planning and responding to outbreaks of avian flu. With the Bank donation of US$2.65 million, the project strengthened the ability of agricultural and health departments in identifying, diagnosing, reporting and systematically addressing HPAV infections. 9 The success led to an additional $3.5 million funding to launch the second-phase project. GHG players also found it difficult to influence policy implementation because of the perverse central-local relationship. As Gill and others have observed: "Even when funds are made available in poorer areas to combat HIV/AIDS, such as a major World Bank loan or a grant from the central government, there is no assurance that the resources will be spent efficiently by local government officials, and there is always the possibility that funds for one project will be diverted to fund a different program that lacks resources and is determined to be a higher priority" (Gill and Thompson 2006: 8) . funding but poor accountability end up gaining disproportionately more power than others, and used that power in an irresponsible manner that jeopardizes the growth of Chinese civil society.
The problem is that in absence of effective participation of CSOs, China not only will find it difficult to comply with global health rules, 11 but it will face implementation problems in coping with major health challenges. Its shift from reactive response to overreaction in fighting H1N1 influenza is good example.
Discussions and Conclusions
In examining China's engagement in global health governance, Tan (2009) 
argued that
China's fundamentally state-centered, reactive and material interest-driven approach not only leads to a fairly narrow and limited engagement in global health governance, but may also be unsustainable in the long run because it is increasingly out of synch with the standards for responsible behavior globally. That pessimism was shared by David Fidler, a leading global health scholar, who indicates that China's ability to influence global health governance might be limited by the tensions between the emerging multi-polarity (which calls for bold collective action for effective global governance) and the "Asian style" of consensus and consultation (Fidler 2010b) .
A close examination of China's participation in global health governance suggests two parallel and interrelated processes that seem to defy the pessimistic logic. On the one hand, China's participation is making a difference in global health governance processes and outcomes.
Through its health-related foreign aid it contributes to the health system capacity building in the developing world, especially Africa. Its rise as an exporter of pharmaceutical products also promises to be a game changer in the access to medicine and vaccines. Equally important, as its engagement becomes more substantial, it has shown strong interest and flexibility in global health agenda setting and rule making. On the other hand, despite the opaque and exclusive authoritarian structure in China, global health players, norms, and processes still have a significant role to play in the country's domestic health governance. In terms of agenda setting, they are often critical in moving "latent" public health issues to governmental agenda. In terms of policy formulation, they can affect not only the timing of government action, but also the content of policy design. International actors can also affect policy implementation by influencing the financial and bureaucratic capacities in China. The magnitude and significance of China's participation cannot be simply accommodated by the state-centered Westphalian approach (as argued by Tan) or a structural-normative model (as indicated by Fidler). It seems more appropriate to characterize China's approach as a pragmatic one that combines the utilitarian logic of reaping material benefit, the realist objective of expanding its global power and influence, the neoliberalist interest in pursuing absolute gains from international cooperation, and the constructivist attempt to become a responsible stakeholder in the system.
To be sure, China's engagement in GHG thus far is still narrow and limited, and not always constructive. As evidenced in its handling of the H1N1 outbreak in 2009, while China recognizes the importance of international cooperation in coping with global health challenges, realpolitik continues to drive its foreign policy behavior in international health cooperation.
Approaching GHG in an individualistic and state-centric manner thus threatens to lead to further fragmentation of the global health regimes. But the discrepancy between the neoliberal penchants of international cooperation and the realist-driven actual state response is not unique to China. 12 Similarly, the influence of GHG players, processes and institutions on domestic health governance is limited and is not always positive. They may send wrong and inconsistent signals to the government, which may be used by the latter to justify the maintenance of ineffective policies. Their influence in policy formulation is mainly confined to the analytical stage. When the discussions and pressures move from the scientific to the political, decision makers have more incentives to disregard international pressures or rules. They may have little influence in determining the outcomes of policy implementation at the local level. The constraints and limits of GHG on domestic health governance may be attributed to the statecentered governance mentality, but they also reflect the perverse state-society relations and the influence of entrenched domestic special interests.
Perhaps equally important, these constraints and limits are not static as the domestic and international context for China's engagement is changing. In view of the growing international pressure for shouldering more global responsibilities, nationalist intellectuals and officials may still view the demands and pressures as part of an international conspiracy to thwart China's development. 13 But more pragmatic officials do feel strongly the need to expand China's participation in GHG. The Ministry of Health, for example, is following the Swiss example and drafting its own global health strategy, which is expected to be released this coming summer.
14
The new strategy may lead to the establishment of a specialized development assistance agency.
For 2012-13, China's share in the WHO assessed funding increased to 3.18 percent, which makes China the largest contributor among all the developing countries (WHO 2010). On the domestic front, there are signs suggesting the state is willing to give more space for civil society groups in the health policy process. In July 2010, the Chinese government and civil society joined hands for the first time in responding to HIV/AIDS by launching China Red Ribbon
Beijing to share information and pool resources in fighting the disease (China Daily, 7/6/2010).
More recently, the government pledged greater support for civil society organizations involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS (China Daily, 3/2/2012). As China becomes more receptive to international norms, pressures, and influences, it is anticipated to play a much bigger role in global health governance.
12 In October 2009, the HHS secretary suggested that the U.S. would not donate the vaccine to poor countries until 150 million at-risk Americans had been inoculated against the H1N1 virus. 13 Interview with a Chinese scholar, Beijing, April 6, 2011. 14 Interview with a global health scholar, Geneva, February 22, 2012.
